We realize the generalization of the results of the article [8] from symplectic geometry to pseudo-symplectic geometry over Finite Fields.
§1 Introduction
Multi-receiver authentication codes (MRA-codes) are introduced by Desmedt, Frankel, and Yung (DFY) [1] as an extension of Simmons' model of unconditionally secure authentication. In an MRAcodes, a sender wants to authenticate a message for a group of receivers such that each receiver can verify authenticity of the received message. There are three phases in an MRA-codes:
1. Key distribution. The KDC (key distribution centre) privately transmits the key information to the sender and each receiver (the sender can also be the KDC).
2.
Broadcast. For a source state, the sender generates the authenticated message using his/her key and broadcasts the authenticated message.
Veri f ication. Each user can verify the authenticity of the broadcast message.
Denote by X 1 × · · · × X n the direct product of sets X 1 , · · · , X n , and by p i the projection mapping of X 1 × · · · × X n on X i . That is, p i : X 1 × · · · × X n → X i defined by p i (x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ) = x i . Let g 1 : X 1 → Y 1 and g 2 : X 2 → Y 2 be two mappings, we denote the direct product of g 1 and g 2 by g 1 × g 2 , where g 1 × g 2 : X 1 × X 2 → Y 1 × Y 2 is defined by (g 1 × g 2 )(x 1 , x 2 ) = (g 1 (x 1 ), g 2 (x 2 )). The identity mapping on a set X is denoted by 1 X .
Let C = (S , M, E, f ) and C i = (S , M i , E i , f i ), i = 1, 2, ..., n, be authentication codes. We call (C; C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C n ) a multi-receiver authentication code (MRA-code) if there exist two mappings τ : E → E 1 × · · · × E n and π : M → M 1 × · · · × Mn such that for any (s, e) ∈ S × E and any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the following identity holds p i (π f (s, e)) = f i ((1 S × p i τ(s, e)). Let τ i = p i τ and π i = p i π. Then we have for each (s, e) ∈ S × E π i f (s, e) = f i (1 S × τ i )(s, e).
We adopt Kerckhoff's principle that everything in the system except the actual keys of the sender and receivers is public. This includes the probability distribution of the source states and the sender's keys.
Attackers could be outsiders who do not have access to any key information, or insiders who have some key information. We only need to consider the latter group as it is at least as powerful as the former. We consider the systems that protect against the coalition of groups of up to a maximum size of receivers, and we study impersonation and substitution attacks.
Assume there are n receivers
Impersonation attack: R L , after receiving their secret keys, send a message m to R i . R L is successful if m is accepted by R i as authentic. We denote by P I [i, L] the success probability of R L in performing an impersonation attack on R i . This can be expressed as
where i L.
S ubstitution attack: R L , after observing a message m that is transmitted by the sender, replace m with another message m ′ . R L is successful if m ′ is accepted by R i as authentic. We denote by P S [i, L] the success probability of R L in performing a substitution attack on R i . We have
where i L. §2 Pseudo-Symplectic Geometry
Let F q be the finite field with q elements, where q is a power of 2, n = 2ν + δ and δ=1,2. Let
The pseudo-symplectic group of degree (2ν + δ) over F q is defined to be the set of matrices
together with this group action is called the pseudo-symplectic space over the finite field F q of characteristic 2.
Let P be an m-dimensional subspace of F (2ν+δ) q , then PS δ t P is cogredient to one of the following three normal forms
. We say that P is a subspace of type (m, 2s + τ, s, ǫ), where τ =0,1 or 2 and ǫ =0 or 1, if
, and
(ii) e 2ν+1 P or e 2ν+1 ∈ P according to ǫ = 0 or ǫ = 1, respectively.
. Denote by P ⊥ the set of vectors which are orthogonal to every vector of P, i.e.,
More properties of pseudo-symplectic geometry over finite fields can be found in [2] .
In [3] , Desmedt, Frankel and Yung gave two constructions for MRA-codes based on polynomials and finite geometries, respectively. There are other constructions of multi-receiver authentication codes are given in [4 − 7] . The construction of authentication codes is combinational design in its nature. We know that the geometry of classical groups over finite fields, including symplectic geometry, pseudo-symplectic geometry, unitary geometry and orthogonal geometry can provide a better combination of structure and easy to count. In this paper we constructed one multi-receiver authentication codes from pseudo-symplectic geometry over finite fields. The parameters and the probabilities of deceptions of this codes are also computed. We realize the generalization of the results of the article [8] from symplectic geometry to pseudo-symplectic geometry over Finite Fields. §3 Construction Let F q be a finite field with q elements and e i (1 ≤ i ≤ 2ν + 2) be the row vector in F (2ν+2) q whose i−th coordinate is 1 and all other coordinates are 0. Assume that 2 < n + 1 < r < ν. U = e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n , i.e., U is an n−dimensional subspace of F (2ν+2) q generated by e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n , then
The set of source states S ={s|s is a subspace of type (2r − n + 1, 2(r − n), r − n, 1) and U ⊂ s ⊂ U ⊥ }; the set of transmitter's encoding rules E T ={e T |e T is a subspace of type (2n, 2n, n, 0) and U ⊂ e T }; the set of i − th receiver's decoding rules E R i ={e R i |e R i is a subspace of type (n+1, 0, 0, 0) which is orthogonal to e 1 , · · · , e i−1 , e i+1 , · · · , e n }, 1 ≤ i ≤ n; the set of messages M = {m|m is a subspace of type (2r + 1, 2r, r, 1) and U ⊂ m}.
1. Key Distribution. The KDC randomly chooses a subspace e T ∈ E T , then privately sends e T to the sender T . Then KDC randomly chooses a subspace e R i ∈ E R i and e R i ⊂ e T , then privately sends e R i to the i − th receiver, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2.
Broadcast. For a source state s ∈ S , the sender calculates m = s + e T and broadcast m.
Veri f ication.
Since the receiver R i holds the decoding rule e R i , R i accepts m as authentic if
Lemma 3.1
The above construction of multi-receiver authentication codes is reasonable, that is (1) s + e T = m ∈ M, for all s ∈ S and e T ∈ E T ; (2) for any m ∈ M, s = m ∩ U ⊥ is the uniquely source state contained in m and there is e T ∈ E T , such that m = s + e T .
Proof.
(1) For any s ∈ S , e T ∈ E T , Because s is a subspace of type (2r − n, 2(r − n), r − n, 1) and U ⊂ s ⊂ U ⊥ }, we can assume that
Obviously, for any v ∈ V and v 0,v s, therefore,
From above, m is a subspace of type (2r + 1, 2r, r, 1) and U ⊂ m, i.e., m ∈ M.
(2) For m ∈ M, m is a subspace of type (2r + 1, 2r, r, 1) and U ⊂ m, so there is a subspace
Then we can assume that
For s is a subspace of type (2r − n + 1, 2(r − n), r − n, 1) and U ⊂ s ⊂ U ⊥ , i.e., s ∈ S is a source state.
For any v ∈ V and v 0,v s is obvious, i.e.,
, s is the uniquely source state contained in m.
From Lemma 3.1, we know that such construction of multi-receiver authentication codes is reasonable and there are n receivers in this system. Next we compute the parameters of this codes.
Lemma 3.2 The parameters of this construction are
Proof. Since U ⊂ s ⊂ U ⊥ , s has the form as follows 
where B 2 , B 4 is a subspace of type (2(r −n), 2(r −n), r −n, 0) in the pseudo-symplectic space F q (2ν+2) . So |S | = N(2(r − n), 2(r − n), r − n, 0; 2ν + 2).
Since e T is a subspace of type (2n, 2n, n, 0), e T has the form as follows
For e T is a subspace of type (2n, 2n, n, 0), so R 4 = 0 and R 6 = 0, R 2 , R 5 arbitrarily. Therefore
For any e R i ∈ E R i , e R i is a subspace of type (n+1, 0, 0, 0) which is orthogonal to e 1 , · · · , e i−1 , e i+1 , · · · , e n , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. So we can assume that
Since e R i is a subspace of type (n + 1, 0, 0, 0), so H 
Lemma 3.3 (1) The number of e T contained in m is q n(r−n+1) ;
(2) The number of the messages is |M| = q 2n(ν−r+1) N(2(r − n), 2(r − n), r − n, 1; 2ν + 2).
Proof. Let m be a message, from the definition of m, we may take m as follows 
.
if e T ⊂ m, then we can assume that where R 2 and R 7 is arbitrarily. Therefore the number of e T which contained m is q n(r−n+1) ;
(2) We know that a message contains only one source state and the number of the transmitter's encoding rules contained in a message is q n(r−n+1) . Therefore we have
We consider the impersonation attack and substitution attack from R L on a receiver R i , where i L.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that
First, we will proof the following results:
Therefore, e T containing e L has the form as follows
where H 3 , H 7 arbitrarily. Therefore, the number of e T containing e L is q (ν−n+1)(n−l) .
Lemma 3.5 For any
the number of e T contained in m and containing e L is q (r−n+1)(n−l) .;
(2) the number of e T contained in m and containing e L , e R i is q (n−l−1)(r−n+1) . 
Proof. (1) From the definition of m, we may take m as follows
If e L ⊂ m, then e L has the form as follows: 
If e T ⊂ m and e T ⊃ e L , then 
where H 3 and H 9 arbitrarily. Therefore, the number of e T which contained in m and containing e L is q (r−n+1)(n−l) .
(2) Similarly, by computation, we can proof that the number of e T contained in m and containing e L , e R i has the following the form 
, where R 
From above we know that
For any e L , e R i ⊂ m 1 ∩ m 2 , we can assume that , If e T ⊂ m 1 ∩ m 2 and containing e L , e R i , so e T has the form as follows So it is easy to know that the number of e T ⊂ m 1 ∩ m 2 and containing e L , e R i is q (k−r)(n−l−1) .
Theorem 3.7
In the constructed multi-receiver authentication codes, the largest probabilities of success for impersonation attack and substitution attack from R L on a receiver R i are q (n−l)(r−n+1) = 1 q r−l . From above we see, substitution attack from R L on a receiver gets to the maximum when l = r−1.
